Blood minerals and the battle for control in the Rwanda-DRC conflict

The resurgence of the M23 rebellion in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is not just an insurgency – it’s a resource war. At the heart of the Rwanda-DRC tensions is control over coltan, tin, tungsten, gold, and more – minerals essential to modern technology and green energy. Kinshasa has long accused Kigali of backing M23 as a proxy to siphon off these resources.

The U.S. recently sanctioned Rwanda’s state minister James Kabarebe for coordinating the export of minerals smuggled from the DRC. While Rwanda denies involvement, estimates suggest nearly $1 billion in Congolese minerals are illicitly moved into Rwanda annually.

M23’s offensives align with areas of high mineral value. The rebel group has seized territories such as Rubaya – one of the world’s largest coltan mining zones – securing a lucrative revenue stream. The global hunger for these minerals inadvertently bankrolls the conflict. The violence in North and South Kivu is underwritten by minerals that power clean energy and consumer electronics abroad. The uncomfortable link between green technology and conflict minerals is a challenge the world can no longer ignore.

Western governments have ratcheted up pressure on Kigali. The United States sanctioned key Rwandan figures, freezing assets and targeting mineral trading networks linked to M23. The UK paused aid, while the European Parliament urged suspension of a sustainable minerals agreement with Rwanda.

Yet Europe’s stance remains conflicted. The EU signed a critical minerals partnership with Rwanda in early 2024, even as M23’s insurgency raged. Cutting ties now would disrupt supply chains. This exposes a core tension: condemning Rwanda’s role in DRC while still relying on its mineral exports.

Meanwhile, Rwanda’s increasing assertiveness in regional politics complicates efforts to resolve the crisis. Kagame’s government insists its security concerns – namely the presence of anti-Rwandan militias in the DRC – are being ignored. While Kigali frames its involvement as a defensive measure, its economic incentives cannot be overlooked. Rwanda has built a reputation as a stable investment hub in Africa, leveraging its mineral re-export industry to drive growth. If sanctions widen to target mineral exports explicitly, this could challenge Rwanda’s economic model and force a re-calibration of its regional policies.

The turbulence in the Great Lakes region is rippling into global supply chains. Tech firms have long sought to purge conflict minerals, but loopholes persist. The resurgence of M23 and reports of Rwandan smuggling show how illicit minerals enter supply chains. Apple recently suspended sourcing tin, tantalum, tungsten, and gold from both Rwanda and DRC. If major manufacturers follow suit, demand may shift to alternative suppliers like Brazil or Australia. Yet, over half of the world’s tantalum output comes from DRC and Rwanda, making a full pivot difficult.

China could be a major beneficiary of these sanctions. If Western nations and companies shun Rwandan minerals, Chinese buyers are well-positioned to fill the gap. Much of the region’s tantalum and tin already ends up in East Asia before being refined. If Western sanctions push Kigali closer to Beijing, it would reinforce China’s dominance in mineral processing and reduce Western leverage over African supply chains. Unless coordinated global action is taken, minerals will continue flowing, just through different channels.

Beyond Rwanda and Congo, this crisis highlights Africa’s broader role in the global resource economy. The continent holds vast reserves of minerals essential to the green transition. Yet, instead of fueling sustainable development, these resources have historically financed war. The DRC and Zambia are now working to build a battery metals supply chain to reduce raw material exports, keeping more value within Africa. If successful, such initiatives could curb smuggling and reduce reliance on conflict-ridden mining zones.

Will Rwanda relent under sanctions, or will it double down, seeking alternative buyers? A likely scenario is a protracted stand-off. Kigali may quietly use intermediaries for mineral trade, mitigating economic pain. M23, facing funding squeezes, could entrench itself in mineral-rich zones, banking on the fact that it still controls physical assets the world needs. Meanwhile, Kinshasa will rally international support, possibly offering mining concessions to those aiding its fight against M23.

Sanctions alone will not resolve this crisis. Western governments must follow through by supporting DRC’s efforts to stop smuggling, strengthen legitimate mining, and pressure Rwanda through diplomatic channels. Engaging China will be key; if Beijing sees long-term stability in the DRC as beneficial, it may cooperate rather than compete for influence.

African nations, too, have a role to play in shaping the region’s future. The African Union and the East African Community must step up efforts to mediate between Rwanda and DRC, ensuring a diplomatic resolution to the mineral-fueled tensions. Without regional cooperation, the cycle of warlords, illicit trade, and exploitation will persist. The world’s demand for cobalt, tantalum, and tin isn’t going away, and neither are Rwanda’s ambitions or DRC’s grievances. The challenge is ensuring that Africa’s resources fuel development, not conflict.