Polarisation has become the defining feature of American politics. The familiar Republican–Democratic divide no longer fully explains this growing rift.
The sharpest conflict increasingly lies between two newer political camps emerging within the established parties, each offering a fundamentally different vision of America's future. Beneath the two familiar party names, four distinct camps now compete:
The sharpest confrontation is between the two newer schools: MAGA and the progressives. MAGA calls progressives radicals, while progressives accuse MAGA of serving an oligarchy.
Beyond this name-calling lie deep-seated differences between the two camps, fuelling the polarisation on display in US politics.
MAGA combines nationalist appeals to workers with policies favourable to business, lower taxes, and wealthy investors.
Progressives identify this as the core problem. They see concentrated wealth as a source of economic and political failure, advocating higher taxes on the richest Americans and stronger public services.
Their complete contrast of the future is what is fuelling the polarisation. But the source of this polarisation is frustration of ordinary Americans.
To understand why these camps emerged, consider what is known as the 'Average Joe': a middle-income worker who wants a home, a reliable car, affordable healthcare, and enough money to raise a family without fearing the next bill.
Workers like the Average Joe formed the backbone of the US economy after the Second World War.
But from the 1980s onwards, his circumstances began to deteriorate. The reasons behind this shift will be explored in the second part of this series.
For years, Republican and Democratic leaders promised to get his life back on track. But while America became richer, the Average Joe became financially insecure.
The share of Americans living in middle-income households fell from 61% in 1971 to 51% in 2023, while the middle-class share of total household income declined from 62% in 1970 to 43% in 2022.
By 2024, the median single-family home price was five times median household income, compared with around 3.2 times throughout the 1990s.
This does not mean every American became poorer. It means that national growth was not equitable.
The Average Joe faced rising living costs and greater financial strain, even as America grew wealthier.
When traditional Democratic and Republican leaders could not diagnose the problem and offered similar explanations, the Average Joe started looking elsewhere.
This is where MAGA recognised the opening.
In 2016, Trump attacked traditional Republicans alongside Democrats, accusing both of neglecting American workers, accepting bad deals and serving interests detached from ordinary people's lives. He defeated his party's established contenders before defeating Hillary Clinton.
Republican leaders subsequently accommodated him, allowing MAGA to capture the party.
Meanwhile, Sanders offered an alternate explanation for the plight of the Average Joe in the same election cycle.
Instead of talking about bad deals and immigrants, he accused established politicians of pursuing pro-billionaire policies at ordinary workers' expense. Rather than reducing taxes, he campaigned to increase taxes on billionaires to improve those workers' lives.
While Trump succeeded in 2016, Bernie failed to secure the nomination.
Two rebellions had emerged within the two established parties at the same time. Both were trying to solve Average Joe's problem, but only MAGA reached the White House.
For Joe, Trump's appeal could resemble a political romance. He was promised better jobs, manageable bills, and a government that finally noticed him.
His support was not necessarily an endorsement of every statement Trump made, it reflected hope that someone who recognised his frustration would act differently.
Trump's return to power in 2024 showed that enough voters remained willing to believe that promise. But recognising a problem is one thing, solving it is another.
Two years after that election, the Average Joe faces a difficult comparison between expectation and experience. In September 2026, consumer prices were 3.7% higher than a year earlier, gasoline prices were up 34.2%, and inflation-adjusted average hourly earnings had fallen 0.7%.
To compound his worries, the Average Joe was promised that MAGA would put him at the centre, with no foreign entanglements. Yet, he sees America waging another expensive but avoidable war with Iran.
His romance with MAGA now faces a reckoning at the gas station, with a widening gap between promise and delivery.
The midterm elections will, therefore, test how far dissatisfaction with MAGA has travelled. A movement built on the establishment's failures may discover that voters now judge it by the same standard.
As infatuation with MAGA declines, the fourth camp – the progressives – sees its opening.
Their argument is that the Average Joe trusted a movement whose priority was never the average American but the billionaire class. They are challenging an economic order that benefits concentrated wealth. They propose higher taxes on extreme wealth, stronger labour protections, and public provision that reduces the cost of essentials.
Their challenge to establishment Democrats is also becoming tangible.
Zohran Mamdani defeated former New York governor Andrew Cuomo in New York City's Democratic mayoral primary, while Abdul El-Sayed defeated the more moderate Haley Stevens for Michigan's Democratic Senate nomination.
Both belong to the progressive camp rather than the traditional Democratic establishment.
These victories are among the indications that a sea change is brewing within the Democratic Party. A takeover similar to MAGA's transformation of the Republicans may now be emerging among Democrats.
Of the four political camps in US politics, three have now had opportunities to lead national government: traditional Republicans like Reagan and both Bushes, establishment Democrats like the Clintons and Obama, and now MAGA.
The progressive left has influenced policy and governed locally, but has not controlled policymaking at the national level.
They do not carry the burden of old-guard Democratic and Republican policies. They do not have to worry about the incumbency factor facing MAGA as it defends its presidential record and fading promise of change.
All this gives progressives an advantage as the Average Joe searches for alternatives in these midterm elections.
The fading promise of MAGA has led to opinion polls favouring the Democrats. Early voting trends have also fuelled expectations of a blue wave.
Some are anticipating a blue tsunami. Yet a Democratic victory would answer only half the question.
Beneath the blue tally, which camp would actually gain power: the old guard offering familiar reassurance, or the progressives offering a break with the past and a new solution?
By the time the second part of this series arrives, the midterm results should be in. America will still elect candidates under two party names, but the outcome will indicate which of these four camps has gained the Average Joe's trust and which is gathering momentum ahead of the next presidential election in 2028.
About the Author: Waqas M Awan is a Luxembourg-based corporate professional and the author of Power of Sage: An Anti-thesis to Machiavellian Prince. He writes on economics, geopolitics, and power systems at his Substack publication Perspectives (waqasperspective). He has held senior finance roles at Amazon, Kraft Heinz, and KPMG.
